Approximate Congestion Games for Load Balancing in Distributed
  Environment by Chakraborty, Sandip et al.
Approximate Congestion Games for Load
Balancing in Distributed Environment
Sandip Chakraborty, Soumyadip Majumder, Diganta Goswami ?
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
Indian Institute of Technology, Guwahati
Guwahati, India
Email: {c.sandip, s.majumder, dgoswami}@iitg.ernet.in
Abstract. The use of game theoretic models has been quite success-
ful in describing various cooperative and non-cooperative optimization
problems in networks and other domains of computer systems. In this
paper, we study an application of game theoretic models in the domain
of distributed system, where nodes play a game to balance the total pro-
cessing loads among themselves. We have used congestion gaming model,
a model of game theory where many agents compete for allocating re-
sources, and studied the existence of Nash Equilibrium for such types of
games. As the classical congestion game is known to be PLS-Complete,
we use an approximation, called the -Congestion game, which converges
to -Nash equilibrium within finite number of steps under selected condi-
tions. Our focus is to define the load balancing problem using the model
of -congestion games, and finally provide a greedy algorithm for load
balancing in distributed systems. We have simulated our proposed sys-
tem to show the effect of -congestion game, and the distribution of load
at equilibrium state.
1 Introduction
One of the most important problem to attain high performance in distributed
system with heterogeneous clients is to balance the total loads of all the process-
ing jobs among the whole system, such that the processing burdens of all clients
are almost same. This is the classical problem of load balancing in distributed
system. A distributed system can be considered as a collection of computing de-
vices connected with communication links by which resources are shared among
active users. In [3], the authors describe the load balancing problem as follows
“Given the initial job arrival rates at each computer in the system find an alloca-
tion of jobs among the computers so that the response time of the entire system
over all jobs is minimized”. This definition of load balancing problem can be
viewed as the Static Load Balancing, where the main assumption is that all in-
formation governing load-balancing decisions such as characteristics of jobs, the
? A version of this paper has been presented at International Workshops on Distributed
Systems, 2010, held at IIT Kanpur, India, as “work-in-progress” document.
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computing nodes and the communication links are knows at advance. Here load-
balancing decisions are made deterministically or probabilistically at compile
time and remains constant during runtime. A variant of classic load balancing
problem is the Dynamic Load Balancing, where load balancing decisions are
made at run time, and according to the current load of different computing de-
vices, loads are transferred from one computing device to another dynamically
at run time. In [6], the authors have shown that static load balancing algorithms
are more stable in compare to dynamic load balancing algorithms and it is easy
to predict the behavior of static algorithms. In this paper we model such static
load balancing algorithm for distributed system using congestion game model.
The problem of load balancing in distributed system can be handled in three
ways:
– Global Approach: A single decision maker optimizes the overall response
time using some optimization techniques. This approach is also called as
social optimum. This is the most frequent literature in study and has been
studied extensively using different techniques such as nonlinear optimization,
polynomial optimization etc.
– Cooperative Approach: This is based on classical cooperative game theory
where the decision makers cooperate between themselves by sharing infor-
mations through message passing, and then take the decision using the utility
and pay-off function. In [3], the authors have modeled the problem of load
balancing in distributed system using cooperative game theoretic approach.
– Non-cooperative Approach: Here the decision is made using the pay-off and
utility function, but the agents does not share any information between them-
selves. Congestion game is a variant of non-cooperative games where each
agent’s strategy consists of a set of resources, and the cost of the strategy
depends only on players using each resource.
Congestion games have attracted a good deal of attention, because they can
model a large class of routing and resource allocation scenarios. Another rea-
son for using congestion games in resource allocation is that they possess pure
Nash equilibria [15]. In general games, Nash equilibrium may involved mixed (
i.e., randomized) strategies for players, but congestion game always have a Nash
equilibrium in which each player sticks to a single strategy. But the problem
with Nash equilibrium in congestion game is that they are known to be PLS-
Complete[14]. So it is difficult to find a Nash equilibrium in congestion games
and so the convergence time is very high. In [7], the authors describe a variant
of congestion game, called -congestion game which is an approximate version
of pure Congestion games, and have been proved to possess a better conver-
gence rate. The authors have proved that -Nash dynamics in -congestion game
converge to an -Nash equilibrium within a finite number of steps.
We have used the formulation of -Nash Equilibrium, as described in [7], to
model the problem of load balancing in distributed system as a resource sharing
problem. We have studied the formulation of the problem and the existence of
-Nash equilibrium for the problem.
2 Related Works
The problem of static load balancing for single class job distributed system has
been studied extensively for global approach. In global approach the focus is
to minimize the overall response time. In [8], the authors have formulated the
load balancing problem as a nonlinear optimization problem and have given an
algorithm to solve that nonlinear optimization problem. In [10] and [11], Kim
and Kameda derived a more efficient algorithm to introduce the problem. An
comparison between several static load balancing algorithms with respect to job
dispatching strategy has been studied by Tang and Chanson, in [9].
The load balancing problem using game theoretic approaches also has been
studied both for cooperative and non-cooperative approach. In [12], Altman,
Kameda and Hosokawa modeled distributed system as collection of nodes con-
nected by either simplex or duplex connected links, and then described the dy-
namic load balancing problem for this system using game theoretic approach.
They have established the proof for a unique Nash equilibrium for routing games
with the above mentioned distributed system model, under quite general assump-
tion on the costs. For this, they have considered two different architectures, in
one the nodes are connected using duplex link, and in another they are con-
nected via two one-way communication links. In [3], the authors have modeled
the system as an M/M/1 queue, and then proposed an algorithm, called “Coop-
erative Static Scheme”(COOP), using Nash Bargaining Solution, an interesting
variant of cooperative game theoretic concepts and the solution of the problem
using first order Kuhn-Tuker conditions. They have also compared their Nash
bargaining solution algorithm with the existent static and dynamic load balanc-
ing algorithms.There are very few literatures in studying the non-cooperative
models for load balancing problems in distributed systems. Kameda et al. [2]
studied non-cooperative games and derived load balancing algorithms for both
single class and multi class job distributed systems. For single class job, they
have proposed an algorithm for computing Wardrop equilibrium, a variant of
Nash equilibrium where number of agents participating in the game is infinite.
In [13], the author has modeled the load balancing problem as a Stackelberg
game, where one player acts as a leader and rest as followers. He has showed
that optimal Stackelberg Strategy computing is NP-hard and hence he formu-
lated a near optimal solution. In [5], the authors has proposed an uncoordinated
load balancing algorithm for peer-to-peer system. They have analyzed the Nash
Equlibrium under general latency function for a P2P system.
In this paper we have moved from these general game theoretic approaches,
and modeled the problem as a congestion game, the most suitable strategy to
model resource allocation problems using non-cooperative game models. The
work of [14] shows that finding a pure Nash equilibrium is PLS-Complete, and
hence the convergence time for congestion games, that always produces a pure
Nash equilibrium, is very high. Again, for some initial strategies the shortest
path to an equilibrium in the Nash dynamics is exponentially long according to
the the number of players. In [4], the authors has proposed a selfish load bal-
ancing problem using atomic congestion game, and have shown that the worst
case ratio between a Nash Solution and a Social Optimum, which is referred
several times as Price of Anarchy, is at most 2.5. A recent advance in the field of
congestion gaming model is -congestion game. In [7], the authors have studied
these issues for congestion games, and proposed an approximation of pure con-
gestion game, which they named as -congestion game, where -Nash dynamics
converges to an -Nash equilibrium within a finite number of steps under some
bounded conditions. This work on the approximation on pure congestion game
is the primary motivation behind our work to check how the load balancing
problem can be well suited with the approximated congestion game, or the -
congestion game. We have used this version of congestion game to model our
load balancing scheme. Finally we have shown by simulation that using a proper,
well chosen value of , we can reduce the number of iteration for congestion game
to a very lower bound, and at this bound the load is well distributed among the
processing nodes to minimize the processing time.
3 Concept of Congestion Game
In this paper we address the problem of load balancing in the general arena of
Congestion Game, or more specifically an approximation of classical congestion
game, called -Congestion Game. A congestion game can be formally described
as a finite set of players {p1, p2, ..., pn}, each of which is assigned a finite set
of strategies Si and a cost function ci : S1×S2...×Sn−→N that he wishes to
minimize. A state s = (s1, s2, ..., sn) ∈ S1 × S2 × ...× Sn is any combination of
strategies for the player. A state s is a pure Nash Equilibrium if for all players
pi, ci(s1, s2, ..., si, ..., sn) ≤ ci(s1, s2, ..., s´i, ..., sn) for all s´i ∈ Si. Thus we can say
that at a pure Nash equilibrium, no player can improve his cost by unilaterally
changing his strategy. It is well known that every finite game has a mixed Nash
equilibrium, but not a pure Nash equilibrium. Whereas congestion game always
has pure Nash equilibrium.
In case of congestion games, players’ cost are based on the shared usage of
a common set of resources ( also called edges, in terms of network congestion
games) R = {r1, r2, ..., rm}. A player’s strategy set Si ⊆ 2R is an arbitrary collec-
tion of subsets of R; his strategy ri will be therefore a subset of R. Each resource
r ∈ R has an associated nondecreasing delay function dr : {1, 2, ..., n} −→ N. If
t players are using the resource r, they will each incur a cost of dr(t). As a result
in a state s = (s1, s2, ..., sn), the cost of player pi is ci(s) =
∑
r∈si
dr(fs(r)), where
fs(r) is the number of players using resource r under s; i.e. fs(r) = |{j : r ∈ sj}|
.
In [16], the author has shown that in every congestion game,every sequence of
improvement steps is finite. This proposition can be shown by a potential func-
tion argument, called the Rosenthal’s Potential function φ :
∑
1×...×
∑
n −→ Z,
defined as
φ(s) =
∑
r∈R
fs(r)∑
i=1
dr(i)
This function has an interesting property that if player pi shifts strategy from
si to s´i, the change in φ exactly mirrors the change in the player’s cost: i.e.,
φ(s) − φ(s´) = ci(s) − ci(s´). The consequence from this observation is that, if
we follow an iterative process here, such that, at each step one player changes
its strategy to lower his cost ( a Nash dynamics), then the potential function
φ will decrease until it reaches a local minimum, which must be a pure Nash
equilibrium. But this does not provide a bound on the number of such player
moves required to reach a pure Nash equilibrium in a congestion game ( so the
congestion game is PLS-Complete), and this problem leads to the concept of a
approximate Nash equilibrium, which is -Nash equilibrium.
4 -Nash Dynamics and -Nash Equilibrium
In [7], the authors has studied and formulated the concept of -Nash Dynamics
and -Nash equilibrium. A state s is an -Nash equilibrium if no player can
improve his cost by more than a factor of  by unilaterally changing his strategy.
The -Nash dynamics is a modification of pure Nash dynamics, where players
are permitted only -moves, i.e. moves that improve the cost of the player by a
factor of more than . To make -Nash dynamics concrete, the authors assume
that among multiple players with -moves available, at each step a move is made
by the player with the largest incentive to move; i.e. the player who can make the
largest relative improvement in cost. For this reason they have also introduced α-
bounded jump, where the delay function satisfies the condition dr(t+1) ≤ αdr(t)
for all t ≥ 1 and α ≥ 1. In particular, a resource ( or edge) with dr(t) = αt
satisfies the α-bounded jump condition. They show that in such a condition,
-Nash dynamics converge to an -Nash equilibrium within a finite number of
steps, in fact in
⌈
nα−1 log (nC)
⌉
steps, where C is an upper bound on the cost
of any player. This is the main motivation behind our work to use this modified
approximate congestion gaming model to solve the load balancing problem in
distributed system.We have the following theorem about -Nash equilibrium [7].
Theorem 1. For  ∈ [0, 1), a state s = (s1, ..., sn) ∈ S1 × ...× Sn is an -Nash
equilibrium if for all player pi, ci(s1, ..., s´i, ..., sn) ≥ (1− )ci(s1, ..., si, ..., sn) for
all s´i ∈ Si.
5 System Model
In a distributed system, some nodes act as the processor nodes, who process
the jobs, and some nodes act as the load generator, who generates processes or
jobs in a certain rate. We call the processor nodes as the servers, and the load
generators as the client. It should be noted that in a typical distributed system,
same node can act both as server and clients. But for the simplicity of modeling
the system, we consider server and clients as separate nodes without the loss of
generality, and our target is to assign the clients to the servers in a balanced
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Fig. 1. Distributed System Model for Load Balancing Problem
way, such that the jobs generated at the clients are distributed almost equally
among the servers and the overall system response time is minimized. Hence we
need to generate a bipartite graph with n servers and m clients as shown in the
figure 1. We use following parameters to model our system:
µmaxi = The maximum processing rate of server i.
µi = The actual or effective processing rate of server i.
φj = Load generation rate at client j.
Sji = Fraction of the load assigned to server i by client j.
φ =
m∑
j=1
φj which is total job arrival rate in complete distributed system.
Here, j=1,2,...,m and i=1,2,...,n. It is obvious that for each client j;
n∑
i=1
Sji = 1; where 0 ≤ Sji ≤ 1 ; and i=1,2,...,m
Our objective is to find the fraction Sji for each client j (j = 1,...,m) such that
the expected execution time of the jobs in the system is minimized. We have the
following conditions;
At each server i;
m∑
j=1
Sjiφj < µi; which implies that actual processing rate at any instance at server
i must be less than the processing rate capacity or the advertised processing rate
of server i.
Modeling each computer as an M/M/1 queuing system [17],
Fi(βi) =
1
µi−βi , where βi = average arrival rate of jobs at server i and Fi(βi)
denotes the expected execution time of jobs processed at server i. For M/M/1
queueing system, the above condition must be satisfied also which guarantees
stability of the overall system.
In our case, βi =
m∑
j=1
Sjiφj
Hence, Fi(βi) =
1
µi−
m∑
j=1
Sjiφj
We can calculate the overall response time of client j as follows:
Rj(βi) =
n∑
i=1
SjiFi(βi) =
n∑
i=1
Sji
µi−
m∑
k=1
Skiφk
Our objective is to minimize the overall response time of the system.
6 Load Balancing as a -Congestion Game among Clients
Let for client j, the vector Sj = (Sj1, Sj2, ..., Sjn) be the load balancing strategy
of client j. Then the set S = {S1, S2, ..., Sm} corresponds to the strategy space
or strategy profile of our load balancing game. The cost function of client i is
ci = Ri(βj), and the corresponding delay function at resource i is dr(t) = Fi(βi)
where t is the number of resources, that is number of servers in load balancing
game. It is clear that the delay function depends on number of clients associated
with the particular resource and the function is nondecreasing. At this point of
instance, we have the following assumptions:
(i) Each server i can tolerate up to a maximum job arrival rate λmaxi . Though
in theory each server is capable to process jobs up to its processing rate,
but in practice the performance of the system drops dramatically after a
specific amount of load, because each server has to process some internal
loads also. So this assumption is more likely to the real world scenario and
required to proof the convergence of our -congestion game.
(ii) There is a maximum job generation rate at the system φmax. This assump-
tion is also near to reality.
The convergence property for our load balancing -congestion game can be
shown using following theorem 2.
Theorem 2. (α-bounded Jump Condition) The delay function for resource
j, as given above is nondecreasing and satisfies the α-bounded jump condition for
-congestion game.
Proof. For resource i,
dr(t) =
1
µi−
t∑
j=1
Sjiφj
, and
dr(t+ 1) =
1
µi−
t+1∑
j=1
Sjiφj
Hence,dr(t+1)dr(t) =
µi−
t∑
j=1
Sjiφj
µi−
t+1∑
j=1
Sjiφj
This can be simplified as,
dr(t+1)
dr(t)
= 1 +
S(t+1)iφt+1
µi−
t+1∑
j=1
Sjiφj
So, it is clear that dr(t + 1) ≥ dr(t), so the delay function is nondecreasing.
According to our assumptions, for each server j, we can get αj as;
αj = 1 +
φmax
µi−λmaxi
clearly, αj > 1 for all server ( resources ) j. Hence the α-bounded jump condi-
tion is satisfied. So in this game, the -Nash dynamics will converge to -Nash
equilibrium within a finite number of steps.
We define the potential function for our game which is similar to Rosenthal’s
Potential Function, but with a multiplier in addition with the delay function.
The multiplier comes because the overall response time of all the servers depends
on a fraction of each client’s load. The potential function φ(s) with strategy set
s of the system is as follows :
φ(s) =
n∑
j=1
m∑
i=1
Sij
1
µj−
m∑
k=1
Skjφk
where m is the number of clients (players) and n
is the number of servers (resources). It is clear that the overall system response
time depends only on those fractions for which the multiplication factor Sij is
nonzero. The cost function incurred at each client i with strategy set s is as given
before;
ci(s) =
n∑
i=1
Sji
µi−
m∑
k=1
Skiφk
Theorem 3. (Existence of Exact Potential Function) The potential func-
tion as defined above obeys the property of Rosenthal’s Potential Function, i.e. if
player pi shifts strategy from s to s´, the changes in φ exactly mirrors the change
in the player’s cost.
Proof. As
n∑
i=1
Sji = 1 for each client j, so the total weighted sum of the multipliers
at both the cost function and potential function is always 1, which is a constant
value, and thus it does not incurs any change in the relative deference between
potential functions and costs with two strategies s and s´. At each independent
move, the change in the player’s cost is equal to the change in total delay at
all resources, as the delay at each resources reflects directly at the player’s cost.
Hence from the structure of both the functions it is easy to conclude that, φ(s)−
φ(s´) = ci(s)− ci(s´), which follows the theorem.
It can be also checked easily that the cost function satisfies Theorem 1, that is
the cost can be increased always above a threshold given by the value of . Hence
it is clear that our load balancing game model converges to -Nash equilibrium
within a finite steps. Our objective is to minimize the potential function starting
from a initial strategy s0, where each node independently tries to minimize its
own cost function and that directly reflects the change in overall system response
time which can be measured using the potential function as defined above.
The optimization problem at each client i will be as follows;
minSjRj(s) where Sj is the current strategy profile for client j and s is the
strategy set of the system.
Algorithm OPTIMAL:
Input: µ1, µ2, ..., µn, φj
Output: Sj , the strategy set for user j
Arrange the computers in decreasing order of their processing rates,
µ1, µ2, ..., µn
let temp←
n∑
i=1
µi − φj
while temp ≥ µn do
Sjn ← 0;
n = n− 1;
temp←
n∑
i=1
µi − φj ;
end
sum =
n∑
i=1
µi;
foreach i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} do
loadFrac = µi/sum;
if canAssign(loadFrac) then
Sji ← loadFrac;
end
else
Sji ← 0;
sum = sum− µi;
end
end
Algorithm 1: Calculating Optimal Solution for Client j with Current Effective
Processing Rates µ of Servers
Subjected to;
Sji ≥ 0, i=1,2,...,n
n∑
i=1
Sji = 1
n∑
k=1
Skiφk < µi, i=1,2,...,m
From the above conditions it is clear that the servers with higher processing
power should have higher fractions of jobs assign to it. If the computers are
arranged in the decreasing order of their processing rates, then we get a partial
order for client j as Sj1 > Sj2 > ... > Sjn. Now in real system, there will be
some servers with low processing rates, where no load will be assigned. So after
a index k, Sji = 0 for i=k,k+1,...,n.
Now when a client j runs its own optimization problem, the algorithm is
given in (Algorithm 1).Each client node runs this algorithm independently to
find out its own local optimum solution.
For the overall system optimization, we assume that the clients enter the
system one after another. This assumption follows directly from the properties
Algorithm LOAD BALANCE:
Input: S0, initial strategy set, and µ = {µ1, µ2, ..., µn}, the current effective
processing rate of servers
Output: Seq, the strategy at Nash Equilibrium
x = 1;
foreach client j at iteration x do
foreach Server i do
Initialize µi ← µmaxi
end
foreach Server i do
µxi ← µ(x−1)i −
m∑
k=1;k 6=j
Skiφk ;
end
Sxj = OPTIMAL(µ1, µ2, ..., µn, φj);
Compute cxj (S
x
j ), the cost of user j with strategy profile S
x
j ;
if cxj (S
x
j )− c(x−1)j (S(x−1)j ) <  then
Sxj = S
(x−1)
j ;
cxj = c
(x−1)
j ;
end
x = x+ 1
end
Exit when there is no change in cost, that is Nash equilibrium has been reached.;
Algorithm 2: Load Balancing using -Congestion Game
of potential function. The initial strategy set of the system is S0, and according to
the property of -Nash equilibrium, the system converges within a finite number
of steps with any initial strategy. One initial strategy can be that whole job of
a node is assigned to its own server. With this initial strategy the system moves
to a new state as (Algorithm 2). The algorithm works as a greedy strategy
where each node chooses the current best solution and according to the greedy
property and reachability conditions of congestion games, the system guarantees
to be terminated at -Nash Equilibrium within a finite number of steps. Here the
system designer needs to choose  according to the system design using practical
simulation.
7 Simulation Results
We have simulated the system using a program written in Java programming lan-
guage. Each server has some maximum processing rates, and we use the random
number generator to generate load at each clients. The unit of the processing
rates of the server and the job generation rate at client is taken as number of jobs
per second. For our simulation we have taken different situation with different
number of servers with processing rates varying from small to large amount, and
similarly for clients. We have maintained the dynamic nature of the system as
much as possible while setting up the simulation environment.
Fig. 2. Convergence at Nash equilibrium
To show that the load is balanced among the processing nodes, we have
defined the metrics Load Ratio.The metrics is defined as follows,
LRi =
Li
µmaxi
=
µmaxi −µi
µmaxi
;
where,
LRi = Load Ratio at server i,
Li = Total Load assigned at server i,
µmaxi = Maximum processing rate of server i,
µi = Current Effective processing rate of server i.
In figure 2 we have shown two test cases with different set of processing
rates at servers and job generation rates at clients. We can see from the figure,
that after certain number of rounds, the system converges to the equilibrium
state, and at the equilibrium state the cost is stable and minimized. Note that
Congestion game always have a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium, and hence the
Nash Equilibrium here is unique.
In figure 3 and figure 4 we have shown four different test cases where each test
case has same number of clients and servers, but with different set of maximum
processing rates and job generation rates. From figure 3, we can see that at
 = 6.1 × e−5, all the systems converges to a state, where it gives minimum
cost, and decreasing the value of  does not improve the system cost. With
Epsilon = 6.1e-005
Fig. 3. Cost with different  values
 = 6.1 × e−5, we can see from figure 4 that the number of rounds required to
converge at Nash Equilibrium state is smaller than number of rounds required for
pure strategy Congestion Game, which is essentially with  = 0. Thus we can see
with properly chosen  value, -Congestion game converges to Nash Equilibrium
rapidly, but with same cost than the pure Congestion Game.
In figure 5 and figure 6 we have shown the distribution of load among the
server nodes. We have considered three cases, when the load is high, that is all
clients generate jobs with high rates, when the load is low, that is job generation
rate is low, and when the rate is average, that essentially follows the median of a
Gaussian distribution. We can see from the figures that when load is high, all the
server nodes has been assigned some load, but when load is low, only the servers
with high processing rates gets the load to make the system performance better.
The servers with low processing rates are only considered when load is very high.
Hence we can have an effective distribution of loads among the processing nodes.
8 Conclusion and Future Works
In this paper we have proposed a completely new framework for load balancing
using -Congestion game. We have shown the existence of pure Nash equilibrium
in such a game and proposed a greedy algorithm to solve the problem. In spite
of modeling the problem using pure congestion game as it is PLS-Complete, we
Epsilon = 6.1e-005
Fig. 4. Number of rounds to find out the convergence state with different  values
have used the approximation of congestion game that converges to the equilib-
rium state within a finite number of steps. It should be noted that in [7], the
authors have also proved that even for symmetric congestion games with the
bounded jump condition on all edges, finding a Nash equilibrium can still be
PLS-complete; thus in this sense, bounded jumps are not a major restriction on
the power of congestion games. This is a future motivation of study to check
whether the processing overheads of -congestion game is significantly larger
than symmetric congestion game or not. Finally we have simulated the system
to show that with a properly chosen value of , the system converges rapidly to
the Nash equilibrium than the pure Congestion Game. We have also shown by
simulation that the system distributes the load properly among the processing
nodes, and hence the load balancing is achieved using a distributed manner.
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